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I. INTRODUCTION
My name is Ronald H.
I live [in] Cleveland, Ohio ....
I am 35 years old.
Currently, I am receiving General Assistance.
I need this money in order to survive.
My G[eneral] A[ssistance] [will be] cut off.
That will mean that I will have no funds which I need.., to live.
I have been trying to find employment.
I would be willing to work at anything.
I can work as a carpenter.
I can also work as a busboy in a restaurant.
It has been several years since I was last able to find steady employment. I have only
been able to find some part-time work ....
These, however, do not provide very much money.
Also, there is no coverage for any medical help.
I am very much concerned about what will happen to me.
Right now I am forced to stay in a shelter.
But that will not last forever.
[Soon], I will have to leave and find other shelter.
I will need the G[eneral] A[ssistance] to afford anything.
Otherwise, I will be homeless.
What can I do?'
Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Greater Cleveland Welfare Rights Organization, Inc., in Support of Plain-
tiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at c-I, c-2, Daugherty v. Wallace, (Ct. C.P. Montgomery County,
Ohio 1992)(No. 92-1206), appeal docketed, No. 13619 (Ohio Ct. App. Montgomery County Aug. 25, 1992).
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Ronald H. is one of many. Scarlet Daugherty is another. Like Ronald H., Scarlet
Daugherty2 is very poor, and she does not have a job. She meets her living expenses with
General Assistance (GA) funds provided by the state. General Assistance programs are
a "last resort," providing financial and medical assistance to eligible impoverished people
who do not qualify for federal or state public assistance programs.3 Such programs are
by definition safety net programs providing support to the poorest of the poor.4
As state budgets are tightened, General Assistance programs have come under attack
in many states. In Ohio, where Scarlet Daugherty lives, the Ohio legislature voted to slash
General Assistance in 1991.' Cash assistance for destitute persons who are not disabled
was slashed from $148 to $100 per month, and for the first time in the state's history, a
time limitation was placed upon receipt of benefits.6 Pursuant to the new statute, non-
disabled poor persons may receive the reduced General Assistance for a maximum of six
months in any twelve-month period.7
In Ohio, as T.S. Eliot suggested, "April is the cruellest month." 8 When Scarlet
Daugherty exhausted her six months of eligibility for assistance on April 1, 1992, she and
approximately 106,000 people who had been receiving General Assistance since October
1991 were terminated from the General Assistance program. 9 They lost eligibility for cash
assistance and medical assistance for six months of the year. How will they pay rent? Buy
medicine? Exist?
One answer has become nearly reflexive-they should get jobs. In all likelihood, this
thought inspired the legislature of the State of Ohio to draft the legislation as it did,
offering year-round assistance to minors, the disabled, and the elderly, while forcing
"able-bodied" adults off the program for six months of the year."' There is definite
political and perhaps moral appeal to cutting assistance to able-bodied adults to motivate
them to work. There is, however, a practical problem with the general assistance scheme
in Ohio, and it is a big problem indeed. The legislature failed to consider whether jobs
were or could actually be available to all of these indigent people. The safety net for the
poor was slashed without regard to whether any employment opportunities were actually
available to them.
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear during the past twenty years that
the Federal Constitution does not impose any affirmative duty upon governments to
provide indigents with their basic needs, either directly or through the provision of a job.
"Welfare benefits are not a fundamental right, and neither the State nor Federal
Government is under any sort of constitutional obligation to guarantee minimum levels
As this article was going to press, the intermediate court issued its decision, affirming the trial court's
conclusion that the Ohio constitutional right to safety does not impose any obligation on the state to provide
minimal welfare benefits. Plaintiffs are considering an appeal to the state's highest court.
Scarlet Daugherty is one of many plaintiffs in the class action suit out of which this article arose.
The majority of other public assistance programs are supported in whole or in part by federal funds
(e.g., aid to dependent children, supplemental security income). See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:1-5-01
(1991).
See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:4-1-03 (1991).
See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:1-5-01 (1991).
6 Id.
Id.
8 T.S. ELIOT, THE WASTE LAND 53 (Harcourt, Bruce & World, Inc. 1963) (1922).
9 See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:1-5-01 (1991). This number was obtained from the "Fact Sheet on
General Assistance," compiled by the Ohio Coalition for the Homeless, Mar. 4, 1992.
'0 See id.
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of support."" There is thus no federal constitutional right to basic needs even though
"[tihe right to basic subsistence is arguably the most fundamental of all human
rights,' ' 12 because "[f]or a person who is starving and without shelter, all other rights
appear to pale in comparison."' 3
Faced with the dead-end nature of attempting to use the United States Constitution
to develop enforceable minimum standards of care for the poor, the poor and their
advocates have looked to state constitutional and statutory law for the protection of basic
needs. Compared to the textual wasteland of the Federal Constitution, state constitutions
have much to offer. Many state constitutions contain substantive provisions dealing
explicitly with poverty, housing, shelter, and nutrition.' 4 Among representative possibili-
ties are New York's requirement that the legislature provide for "aid, care and support
of the needy"' 5 and Alabama's obligation to provide "adequate provision for the
maintenance of the poor."' 6 Many state constitutions also include declarations that set
out as inalienable the right to seek and/or obtain safety and the right to pursue and/or
obtain happiness."' This article chronicles the attempt of advocates for the poor in Ohio
to elucidate protection of basic needs from the state's constitution. The issue presented
itself when the cuts in General Assistance were enacted in Ohio, and the case of
Daugherty v. Wallace was born.' 8 We, the authors, speak not without interest in the case,
as each of us was involved in the litigation.
The Constitution of the State of Ohio grants to all persons the right to enjoy and
defend life and to seek and obtain happiness and safety.' 9 The wording of these rights,
as set out in the state Bill of Rights, is as follows: "All men are, by nature, free and in-
dependent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and seeking and
obtaining happiness and safety." 2 °
The plaintiffs in Daugherty argued that Ohio's constitutional guarantee of the right
of "obtaining... safety" incorporates or encompasses the right of poor citizens to receive
subsistence assistance from the state, in an amount sufficient to enable them to avoid
homelessness and to obtain basic health care.2' Although the happiness and safety clause
has been a fixture of the Ohio constitution since 1802, the question of whether it
encompasses a right to public assistance is a matter of first impression in the State of
Ohio.
Plaintiffs' position was supported by thirty-one amici curiae, consisting of social
service organizations (including shelters, soup kitchens, food pantries, a mental health
association, and a statewide child protection association), the AFL-CIO, religious
organizations, as well as the cities of Cleveland and Cincinnati and the County of Lucas.
" Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 n.9 (1976)
(citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (finding no constitutional right to welfare even
when "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings" are at stake).
12 Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 93 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984).
13 Id.
"4 For a lengthy listing of such substantive provisions, see Burt Neubome, State Constitutions and the
Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 893-95 (1989).
'5 N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § I.
6 ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 88.
t7 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:1-5-01(a) (1991).
"8 Daugherty (No. 92-1206).
'9 OHIO CONST. art I, § 1. Article I of the Ohio constitution constitutes the state Bill of Rights.
20 id.
21 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 17, Daugherty (No. 92-
1206) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memorandum]; see also Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief at 11, Daugherty
(No. 92-1206).
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All amici assert an interest in and/or daily contact with the poorest of Ohioans. The Urban
Morgan Institute for Human Rights of the University of Cincinnati College of Law as
amicus framed the issue more broadly than plaintiffs, urging the court to find that the
Ohio constitutional grant of the right to obtain happiness, in addition to the right to obtain
safety, is also a source of an affirmative right to basic subsistence.22 The Urban Morgan
Institute also asserted that the state's obligation to the poor could be met directly by the
provision of cash or in-kind assistance or indirectly through the provision of a job.23 '
The litigation in Ohio is noteworthy because many states have safety and/or happiness
provisions in their constitutions. Ten other state constitutions likewise proclaim an
inalienable right to seek and/or obtain safety and happiness, an additional ten states
declare an inalienable right to the pursuit of happiness, and many state constitutions
proclaim that government was created for the people's safety or security and/or
happiness.24
. State constitutional language such as this can serve as the basis for a constitutional
right to public assistance sufficient to meet basic needs. Despite this potential, the only
known litigation on the point has been that of the Legal Aid Societies of Cincinnati and
Dayton in Daugherty. This article is published with the hope that the strategies and
arguments invoked in the Ohio litigation for giving content to state constitutional language
and for demonstrating the affirmative nature of the rights to safety and happiness may be
useful to advocates in states with similar constitutional rights.
II. SLASHES IN THE SAFETY NET-OHIO'S GENERAL ASSISTANCE CUTS AND THEIR
IMPACT ON THE POOR AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES
In 1991, the State of Ohio drastically revised and reduced its General Assistance
program, which provides financial and medical assistance to eligible impoverished people
who do not qualify for public assistance programs that are supported in whole or in part
by federal funds.25 The new legislation essentially modified and divided the existing
General Assistance program into two programs: a revised General Assistance program and
a new Disability Assistance (DA) program.26
22 Amicus Curiae Brief of The Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights at 43-46, Daugherty (No. 92-
1206) [hereinafter Morgan Institute Brief].
23 Id. at 43.
24 Like Ohio, the constitutions of several other states document the right to seek (or pursue) and obtain
safety and happiness among inalienable rights. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3;
MASS. CONST. art. I, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4. VT. CONST. art. I, § 1; VA.
CONST. art. I, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Other states include variations on this theme. Idaho's constitution, for example, declares that inalienable
rights include "pursuing happiness and securing safety," IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 1; whereas Kentucky
declares the rights of seeking and pursuing safety and happiness to be inalienable rights. KY. CONST.art I, §
1.
A number of states have chosen to include in their declaration of rights the right to "the pursuit of
happiness," omitting safety. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 1; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1; ARK. CONST. art.
II, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1;
PA. CONST. art. I, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. I, § 1; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 2. Other states
proclaim that government was instituted for purposes including the people's protection, safety or security,
benefit and/or happiness. See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. I, § 1; KY. CONST. § 4; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 1; R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 2; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 1; VA. CONST. art. I, § 3; W. VA. CONST. an. III, § 3; Wyo.
CONST. art. I, § 1.
25 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:1-5-01(A) (1991). These federal programs include aid to dependent
children and supplemental security income.
26 id.
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Under the revised GA program, payments to GA recipients were reduced to $100 per
month27 for a maximum of six months in any twelve-month period.28 When eligibility
for cash assistance ceases, medical assistance also ceases, regardless of a person's ability
to find employment.29 Previously, GA benefits of $148 per month were available year
round if necessary.30 The 1991 legislation abruptly terminated a 190-year-old state policy
of providing assistance to all indigent persons as long as necessary.3'
Under the new legislation, Disability Assistance is available to impoverished adults
who are 1) over 60 years old, 2) pregnant, 3) medication dependant, or 4) disabled for a
duration of more than nine months.32 The definition of disability in the program is
narrow: a person meets the definition only if totally unable to perform virtually any
work.33 A person with a chronic physical or mental impairment who cannot find
employment is not disabled if any jobs exist in the economy that the person could
perform, regardless of whether such employment opportunities are actually available.
People who do not fall into any of the DA categories can get financial and medical
assistance only through the General Assistance program. 4 DA recipients may receive
$115 per month,33 but there is no time limitation on their participation.36 Thus, a DA
recipient may receive cash and medical assistance each.month of the year."
This division of the General Assistance population into the disabled and those not
disabled fails to take into account that many people who are not "disabled" by definition
are nevertheless unable to work and are no less needy or "deserving" than the disabled.
Included in this class are 1) persons who suffer from disabilities of lesser severity or
duration than those meeting the standard for disability under the DA program, but who,
by virtue of these disabilities, are nonetheless unemployable, 2) persons with very limited
education and employment skills who are unable to find employment in the state, and 3)
persons who may be employable but are unable to find jobs, including those who have
exhausted unemployment benefits. Thus, the large majority of persons dependent upon GA
are people who, due to their own personal conditions and circumstances or the inability
of the economy to absorb all the unemployed or both, cannot get a job. They will have
no income, save for food stamps, for six months each year. The time limitation of GA
for persons who have no reasonable prospect of finding employment will cause thousands
27 The Ohio Department of Human Services determines the actual dollar amount that a GA or DA
recipient may receive. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5113.03(B) (Baldwin 1991). The Department recently
calculated that a single adult in Ohio needs $487.00 per month, every month, to meet basic survival needs,
including the amount of money necessary to obtain the minimum requirement for food, clothing, housing,
utilities, transportation, and personal/incidental items. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:1-21-05 (1991). Even
assuming that the person receives a full food stamp allotment, the cash assistance which a recipient gets
under the GA and DA programs does not come close to meeting basic survival needs. Federal law requires
each state to define the standard of need or poverty line, although they are not required to meet that need.
21 See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:1-5-01 (1991).
29 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5113.03 (Baldwin 1992); OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 5101:1-5-0l(B)-(C), 1-5-
013(A)-(C) (1991).
30 Prior to October 1, 1991, the GA program provided financial assistance as well as medical assistance.
As long as a recipient remained eligible for GA, benefits would be provided. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
5113.02(a), 5113.03 (Baldwin 1987), amended by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5113.03 (Baldwin 1991).
3' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5113.03 (Baldwin 1991).
32 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:1-5-02 (1991).
-3 Disability for purposes of the DA program is defined as the inability to work due to a "physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for not less than nine months." OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:1-5-022(C) (1991).
31 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:1-5-024(A) (1991).
35 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5115.01 (Baldwin 1992) (citing 1991 H 298, § 74.10).
36 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:1-5-024(C) (1991).
37 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5115.01 (Baldwin 1992); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:1-21-05 (1991).
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of Ohioans to become destitute and homeless.3" Their health will deteriorate from lack
of medical care. Their future prospects of finding and maintaining employment, however
slim, will dissipate. Moreover, despite continuous eligibility for food stamps, the GA cuts
may cause many of the poor to suffer from the effects of inadequate nutrition. Many of
the poor are faced with a Hobson's choice. To avoid homelessness, they may choose to
sell their food stamps on the black market to get money to pay rent.
39
The cuts in the GA program have, as expected, resulted in increased costs to cities
and counties and other public and privately funded organizations as well. One county
estimated that its economy would lose over $660,000 per month as a result of the cuts in
GA.40 Community agencies cannot fill the gap left by the reduction of state aid. Even
before thousands of the poor were terminated from the General Assistance program,
emergency shelters, mental health programs, emergency food programs, clinics, hospitals,
substance abuse programs, social service agencies, and utility assistance programs were
inundated with more requests for help than they could meet.4 Law enforcement
agencies, including police, courts, jails and prisons, will also face rising costs as some of
the poor are likely to turn to crime out of desperation.42
III. THE POOR IN OHIO RESPOND-A SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION STRATEGIES AND
THE PROCEEDINGS IN DAUGHERTY
On March 16, 1992, four poor Ohioans who were scheduled to be terminated from
General Assistance, and the Ohio Coalition for the Homeless, represented by the Legal
Aid Society of Cincinnati and the Legal Aid Society of Dayton, joined together to file a
class action suit.4 3 Plaintiffs attacked the legislation as unconstitutional on two grounds.
They asserted that the statutory cuts in General Assistance violate the Ohio constitutional
guarantee of the right of "obtaining... safety" 44 because the cuts result in abandoning
"R See Memoranda of Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order,
Christ Church (Episcopal), Drop Inn Center Shelterhouse, Free Store/Food Bank, Saint John's Social Service
Center and The Salvation Army Southwest Ohio Northeast Kentucky Division, at 5, Daugherty (No 92-
1206) [hereinafter Memoranda of Amici Curiae Christ Church]. Amici stated that the GA cuts would lead to
widespread evictions and that shelters would not be able to absorb the homeless. They also noted that the
progress of people moving from shelters to more independent living had been stalled because the reduced
amount of general assistance payments are insufficient to pay for any kind of housing. Id.
In addition, termination of GA benefits for six months may also deprive otherwise eligible recipients
of resuming GA payments when their six-month period of ineligibility ends. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5113.03(C) (Baldwin 1991) reserves GA to persons living in their own homes or other suitable quarters. If
people do not have sufficient funds to maintain a home during the six months when they lose eligibility for
assistance, they will not be eligible to restart GA when their period of ineligibility ends. See OHIO ADMIN.
CODE § 5101:1-5-03 (1991).
31 See Memoranda of Amici Curiae Christ Church, supra note 38, at 4, and accompanying affidavits of
Goldie Lowry and Helen Francis (testifying that the low street value of food stamps on the black market
attests to the volume of stamps being sold).
40 County of Lucas' Motion to Join in Brief of Amicus Curiae City of Cleveland in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, Daugherty (No. 92-1206) and accompanying affidavit of George
Steger.
4 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Federation for Community Planning, Interchurch Council of
Greater Cleveland, Catholic Charities Service Corporation, and Jewish Community Federation of Cleveland,
in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 6, Daugherty (No. 92-1206) and accompanying
affidavits. See also, Memoranda of Amici Curiae Christ Church, supra note 38, at 5.
42 Brief of Amicus Curiae, the City of Cleveland in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 8, Daugherty (No. 92-1206). County of Lucas' Motion to Join in Brief of Amicus Curiae City
of Cleveland in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, Daugherty (No. 92-1206).
43 Daugherty (No. 92-1206).
" OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1.
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many of the poor to the streets, without shelter or health care, leaving them indisputably
unsafe.45 Plaintiffs also challenged the statutory scheme under the state's Equal
Protection Clause because it draws an irrational distinction between the "disabled" who
are presumed to be unemployable and those who do not fall into the category of
"disabled" who are presumed able to work, without regard to whether they could in
actuality find or maintain a job.46
Plaintiffs asserted that the right to safety incorporates or encompasses the affirmative
right of poor citizens to receive subsistence assistance from the state in an amount
sufficient to enable them to avoid homelessness and obtain basic health care.47 One of
the amici, the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, urged the Ohio constitutional
guarantee of the right of "pursuing and obtaining happiness '""4 as an additional
constitutional anchor for the right to public assistance. 9 The Urban Morgan Institute for
Human Rights also framed the scope of the right a bit more broadly than plaintiffs, urging
that the Ohio constitutional rights to happiness and safety encompass a right to basic
subsistence." The term "right to subsistence" is used to describe a guarantee of state
protection against the deprivation of the food, clothing, shelter, and medical care
minimally necessary for a decent life.5'
The most difficult aspect of proving a violation of the right to safety encountered by
plaintiffs was a dispute as to whether the right imposes any affirmative duties on the state.
In this regard, plaintiffs first focused on demonstrating that the failure of the Federal
Constitution to protect basic needs was not controlling.5" Plaintiffs then urged that the
plain meaning of the state constitutional text, the state's unbroken history of providing
assistance to the needy, and an interpretation sensitive to the modem political and
economic context, all indicate or confirm an affirmative obligation.53 In plaintiffs' view,
the right to obtain happiness and safety is meaningless for the unemployed, non-disabled
" Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 18, Daugherty (No. 92-
1206).
46 Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 21, at 15, 35. Although the equal protection argument is distinct
from the subject of this article, the level of scrutiny under equal protection analysis is affected by whether
the court views the happiness or safety clauses as encompassing a right to basic needs.
Plaintiffs presented compelling arguments to demonstrate that the right to safety is a fundamental right
or at least "constitutionally-significant," and thereby merits strict or heightened scrutiny under an equal
protection analysis. Decision and Entry Granting Terry Wallace's Motion to Dismiss; Denying Plaintiffs'
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 7, Daugherty (No. 92-1206) [hereinafter Decision and Entry].
Nevertheless, the trial court held that "there is no fundamental right to public assistance under the Ohio
Constitution" and accordingly applied the rational basis test. Id. In an unwarranted exaltation of the state's
interest in saving money to the status of a constitutional duty, the trial court upheld the statutory scheme
under the rational basis test. The court found it permissible for the legislature to give an extra entitlement to
disabled persons. Id.
Under even the lowest level of scrutiny, the rational basis test, the classifications employed in the GA
statutory scheme further no legitimate governmental objective. Thus, the statutory scheme should have been
invalidated because it treats similarly situated unemployable persons unequally, with drastic consequences.
Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 21, at 47.
47 Plaintiffs sought preliminary relief enjoining the state from terminating class members who had
exhausted their six months of eligibility under the statutory scheme and obligating it to continue cash
assistance at the current level and medical assistance to all GA recipients until the legislature acted to
establish a program with benefits sufficient in amount and type to prevent homelessness and to provide basic
health care on a non-time limited basis. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 21.
48 See OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 1.
49 Morgan Institute Brief, supra note 22, at 14.
'0 Id. at 21.5 1 1d.
52 Id. at 12.
3 Id. at 8.
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poor unless interpreted as imposing an affirmative right to assistance sufficient to provide
shelter and medical care.54
In explaining the affirmative nature of the right to safety and happiness, plaintiffs
hope to shatter the myth that constitutionally recognized rights are only negative in nature,
by showing that many civil and political rights, traditionally viewed as restraints upon
government action, in reality entail considerable governmental action and expense for their
protection. In addition, another common misconception, that the economic right to
subsistence is not readily subject to adjudication, is also addressed.56
Further, The Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights as Amicus cautions against
coloring the interpretation of Article I Section 1 of the Ohio constitution by negative
attitudes toward "hand-out" programs for the poor. A comparison of General Assistance
benefits to governmental subsidies for various individuals and businesses shows that both
perform the same function-stabilizing and remedying imbalances in the economy. 7
Thus, General Assistance benefits as mandated by the Ohio state constitution are entitled
to at least the same public acceptance as these discretionary subsidies.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the trial court, the
Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County, on August 11, 1992."8 Plaintiffs filed an
appeal of the dismissal and denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction to the Court
of Appeals, Second Division, Montgomery County, Ohio.59
IV. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL HAPPINESS AND SAFETY CLAUSES AS THE SOURCE OF
POSITIVE RIGHTS TO BASIC NEEDS
As mentioned above, many state constitutions have clauses declaring as inalienable
the right to seek and/or obtain happiness and/or safety. These clauses may serve as a
source of positive rights to basic needs. As discussed herein, the notion of safety includes
freedom from the dangers of homelessness and lack of health care. The argument that the
notion of happiness also includes material well-being, advanced by amicus The Urban
Morgan Institute for Human Rights, is not so straightforward, yet it is worthy of attention.
Once the right to basic needs is found to be encompassed within a constitutional
guarantee, the next and most challenging issue arises: determining whether the right
imposes an affirmative obligation on the government. The answers can be found in the
state constitutional text construed in light of modern economic conditions and international
human rights law. 6°
A. Interpreting State Constitutional Safety and Happiness Clauses as Affirmative Rights
1. The Right to Safety
As plaintiffs urged, the right to safety encompasses the right to be safe from the
dangers, harms, or risks of being homeless or without basic health care. 6' No stretch of
the imagination is necessary to see that a person vulnerable to the grievous dangers of
54 Id. at 19.
51 Id. at 43-46.
56 Id. at 46-49.
7 Id. at 42.
5 Decision and Entry, supra note 46.
59 Daugherty (No. 92-1206).
6 See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
61 Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 21, at 21.
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homelessness and untreated illness cannot reasonably be considered safe. In fact, neither
the defendants nor the lower court in Daugherty disputed that protection from the dangers
of homelessness or lack of medical care was encompassed within the meaning of safety.
The plain meaning of the term "safety" also encompasses the right to be free from
any sort of dangers or harm. Dictionaries of the period in which the Ohio constitution was
drafted define "safety" as "freedom from danger" or "preservation from hurt." 62 As
such, safety also includes freedom from the dangers of inadequate nutrition.
The divisive issue in the Ohio case is whether the right to obtain safety imposes any
affirmative obligation on the state government.63 A right which requires the government
to take positive action to ensure its protection is commonly referred to as an affirmative
right. Construed affirmatively, the right to safety obligates the state to supply financial
assistance sufficient in amount and type to provide housing and medical benefits for those
unable to provide for themselves.' Under a negative construction of the right to safety
or happiness, the state has no obligation or duty to provide assistance to needy citizens.
The state would only be restrained from placing unreasonable restrictions on an
individual's right to seek and obtain his own safety or happiness. It would then be
permissible for the "[S]tate to stand idly by while citizens fall into indisputably unsafe
circumstances, piously assuring such citizens that it is not interfering with their right to
pursue and obtain safety." 65
The lower court in Daugherty ruled that the safety provision of the Ohio constitution
does not place any affirmative duty on the state to provide public assistance to its citizens.
Rather, the provision of public assistance by the State is seen as discretion-
ary. This Court construes the safety clause in a manner consistent with
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, that citizens are free to seek safety in their chosen manner, subject to
reasonable state regulation and discretion, but that the state has no duty to
furnish that safety.66
The lower court's conclusion is incorrect in that it relied primarily on federal due
process case law to determine that the right to safety did not place any affirmative duty
on the state. 67 In so doing, it failed to address the affirmative nature of the right as
conveyed by the constitutional text and confirmed by a 190-year-long state policy of
providing aid to the poor.6
In any such case it must be remembered that the failure of the United States
Constitution to guarantee a positive right to subsistence is not determinative of whether
subsistence rights are protected by any state's constitution. 69 Federal constitutional
standards provide only a minimal floor of guarantees for individual rights at the state
level. 70 As Justice William Brennan stated, "rediscovery by state supreme courts of the
62 Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 21, at 20-21 (citing NOAH WEBSTER, FIRST EDITION OF AN
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
61 Morgan Institute Brief, supra note 22, at 14-15.
641d. at 11-14.
65 Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 21, at 35.
66 Decision and Entry, supra note 46, at 6-7.
67 Id. at 6.
68 See Morgan Institute Brief, supra note 22, at 8.
69 Id. at 12.
" While United States Supreme Court decisions may be helpful in construing similar provisions of a
state constitution, they are not controlling. Pruncyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). See
generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
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broader protections afforded their own citizens by their state constitutions ... is probably
the most important development in constitutional jurisprudence of our times."'"
Focusing on case law, the Ohio court held that several sections of the Ohio Bill of
Rights, including Article I, Section 1 with its guarantee of inalienable rights, ran "parallel
to" and "similar to" the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.72 It then reiterated that the Federal Due Process Clause confers no
affirmative duty on states to take care of citizens unless the individual has been taken into
custody by the state.73 Adhering to federal case law, the court concluded that the right
to safety imposes no affirmative duties and only restrains the state from interfering with
an individual's efforts to seek and obtain safety.74
The court's analysis missed the point. The language acknowledging the similarities
between the Ohio Bill of Rights and the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
is not meant to limit the state's protection of individual rights to the rights protected by
the Federal Constitution. A warning against such inflexible adherence to federal
interpretation is issued in an Ohio case cited by the lower court.75 Immediately following
the statement that the rights in Article I, Section 1 are similar to the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Ohio court asserted that:
If in the midst of current trends toward regimentation of persons and
property, this long history of parallelism seems threatened by a narrowing
federal interpretation of federal guaranties, it is well to remember that Ohio
is a sovereign state and that the fundamental guaranties of the Ohio Bill of
Rights have undiminished vitality.76
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus -
Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165 (1984) (stating that federal preservation of
civil liberties is a minimum which the states may surpass precluding a clash with the Federal Constitution
itself).
" William J. Brennan, Jr., NAT'L L. J., Sept. 29, 1986, Special Section, at S-2. In fact, state courts are
increasingly extending individual rights through the independent interpretation of state law guarantees. See
Robert A. Sedler, The State Constitutions and the Supplemental Protection of Individual Rights, 16 U. TOL.
L. REV. 465, 469 (1988) (discussing state court decisions invalidating state economic and social regulations
that would have been sustained under the United States Supreme Court equal protection analysis and state
court extensions of privacy and associational interests beyond the federal level of protection). It was
estimated that between 1970 and 1984, state courts rendered more than 250 opinions holding that the
constitutional minimums set by the United States Supreme Court were not sufficient to meet the more
stringent standards of state constitutional law. Brennan, supra note 70, at 548.
72 Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton, 38 N.E.2d 70, 72-73 (Ohio 1941) (stating that OHIO CONST.
art. 1, § I (guarantee of inalienable rights), § 2 (assurance of equal protection of the law), and § 19
(guarantee of inviolability of private property) "have run parallel with" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
Additionally, OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 16 ("due course of law") has been construed to be "the equivalent of
the 'due process of law' clause in the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 72. Due to these similarities, Ohioans,
when faced with a governmental invasion of their individual rights, have jointly invoked the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Ohio Bill of Rights.
7 Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989).
7 See id. at 201.
7 Direct Plumbing Supply, 38 N.E.2d at 73.
76 Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court of Ohio has affirmed that the rights in the Ohio Bill
of Rights may exceed those afforded by the Federal Constitution. State ex rel. The Repository v. Unger, 504
N.E.2d 37, 41 (Ohio 1986) (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring). In fact, the Ohio constitution offers greater
protection of rights than the Federal Constitution in several areas. For example, indigent parents facing a
state-initiated action to terminate their parental rights have a right to appointed counsel under the Ohio
constitution but not under the U.S. Constitution. Beard v. Williams County Dep't of Social Servs., 465
N.E.2d 397, 399 (Ohio 1984).
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Strict adherence to federal standards is thus inappropriate in construing state
constitutional provisions even if the language of the state constitution is identical to that
in the Federal Constitution. Such adherence is totally misplaced in a case such as
Daugherty in which the state constitution grants rights, such as the rights to safety and
happiness, that are absent from the Federal Constitution.77
Because federal law is not controlling, the state constitution must be construed
independently to determine whether it grants positive rights. The affirmative nature of the
Ohio constitutional right to happiness and safety is mandated by the constitutional
provision that "all" have a "right to... obtain" happiness and safety. 8 Similarly, a
number of other states guarantee rights to pursue and/or obtain happiness and safety in
their constitutions. In regard to Ohio's constitutional language, each significant term, the
clause as a whole, and the constitutional characterization of the governmental purpose,
indicate an affirmative obligation by the government to provide assistance.79
First, the affirmative obligation of the government to provide safety through
subsistence assistance is manifest in the guarantee of obtaining safety to "all," 8 ° not just
to those who are able to secure safety by their own efforts. Thus, a person who needs
governmental assistance to meet his subsistence needs is included among those who have
a right to obtain safety and happiness, and the government's failure to provide subsistence
assistance would render the right meaningless. Moreover, the term "obtain" is significant.
The plain meaning of the term "obtain" is not limited to possession through one's own
efforts but includes coming into possession of something by request."
" The federal cases relied upon by the lower court involved plaintiffs who alleged violations of the
Substantive Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at
201. (The plaintiffs relied on the Due Process Clause because the Federal Constitution did not expressly
include the particular substantive right at issue.)
The litigation strategy used in DeShaney (urging the Federal Due Process Clause as a means of protect-
ing substantive rights) is well-worn. In fact, after efforts to derive a set of positive floors in education, health,
nutrition, and shelter directly from the United States Constitution failed, lawyers seeking to use the Federal
Constitution to protect the poor turned to the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to derive positive
rights. See Neuborne, supra note 14, at 887. For the most part, the Supreme Court has refused to use the
Equal Protection Clause and the Procedural Due Process Clause as wholesale substantive substitutes. Id.
Plaintiffs in Daugherty came before the court in an entirely different posture. They raised no due
process arguments. Such an argument was unnecessary because the Ohio constitution, unlike the Federal
Constitution, grants the inalienable right to seek and obtain happiness and safety.
78 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1.
'9 OHIO CONST. pmbl., an. I, § I. Plaintiffs also assert that a practical interpretation of the right to safety
can be gleaned from actual legislative practice. Ohio has a 190-year history, even predating statehood, of
providing assistance to the poor. Plaintiffs assert that this continuous practice is an explicit expression of the
fundamental nature of the right to public assistance when in need, regardless of one's alleged employability.
Plaintiffs traced Ohio's history in providing assistance to the needy from the time Ohio was part of the
Northwest Territory in 1787 (a law enacted in 1795 authorized "overseers of the poor" in each township to
make assessments to support the poor who were unable to work and to provide employment for those
capable of working), through the time of the Great Depression (when the General Assembly enacted a poor
relief program in which poor relief could take the form of either work or direct relief), to much more recent
history (when in 1966, the legislature shifted the responsibility for poor relief to the counties, and in the
1970s, when counties imposed time limitations on eligibility or exclusions from eligibility for allegedly
employable persons they were invalidated under state statutes). Despite changes in the structure and
definition of poor relief, as a matter of state policy, the state has never, until the 1991 GA cuts, excluded
any segment of the population from assistance for any period of time. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note
21, at 18-24.
'o OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 1.
8' See THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1789) ("to acquire;
to procure; to gain... ").
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Second, the clause as a whole is written in positive terms, as a grant of rights to all.
The drafters could have chosen a formulation in which the government's role would be
limited to restraint by prohibiting the states from interfering with a person's right to
happiness and safety.
Third, the statement of governmental purpose in Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Bill
of Rights is couched in affirmative terms: "All political power is inherent in the people.
Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit. ' 8 2 This language
mandates that the state has affirmative obligations to provide for its citizens' benefit and
protection, which logically must include their safety. This is supported by case law in
Ohio, 3 and by direct constitutional language in other states,84 recognizing that the state
government was instituted to secure the protection of rights. The Ohio constitution is
"constructed upon the theory that the majorities can and will take care of themselves; but
that the safety and happiness of individuals and minorities need to be secured by
guarantees and limitations in the social compact, called a 'constitution.' "85 A govern-
ment that is created to secure rights falls far short of its obligations if it views its role as
mere restraint from interfering with those rights.
This affirmative phrasing, that Ohio's government was instituted for the citizens'
protection and benefit and to secure their rights, is interesting in comparison to the more
negative phrasing of the Federal Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, which
speak in terms of prohibitions. The Federal Constitution has been traditionally viewed as
a negative rights document, enumerating restraints upon government. On the contrary,
most state constitutions are enabling documents designed to authorize, not restrain, the
government.86
The Declaration of Independence manifests a government's affirmative role in
protecting rights. Its declaration of the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness is followed immediately by the statement that "to secure these rights,
[g]overnments are instituted among [m]en." 87 As part of the law of the State of Ohio,
and as the inspiration for Article I of the Ohio constitution, the recognition in the
Declaration of Independence of the need for affirmative governmental measures to secure
fundamental rights should be respected in interpreting the Ohio constitution.88
2. The Right to Happiness
A state constitutional right to pursue and/or obtain happiness may serve as a basis for
a right to basic needs. At first blush, this may seem implausible, as the pursuit of
happiness has generally not been ascribed more meaning than the pursuit of livelihood or
occupation. However, examination of the notion of happiness as used in colonial times
yields compelling consideration. Its content is certainly not limited to the pursuit of an
occupation.
82 OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 2.
83 See Toledo Bank v. Bond, I Ohio St. 623, 632 (1853) ("Government is the necessary burden imposed
on man as the only means of securing the protection of rights.").
84 See Neubome, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
85 Kiser v. Board of Comm'rs of Logan City, 97 N.E.2d 52, 53 (Ohio 1911) (emphasis added)
(discussing a taking of private property).
86 See Neubome, supra note 14, at 898.
87 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (specifying that the pursuit of happiness is
an unalienable right). Examination of Jefferson's work reveals that Jefferson intended his more concise
phrase to have the same meaning as Mason's phrase "to seek and obtain happiness." Arthur M. Schlesinger,
The Lost Meaning of the "Pursuit of Happiness," 21 WM. & MARY Q. (3d Ser.) 325, 326-27 (1964).
88 Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Union Sav. Bank Co., 163 N.E. 221, 222 (Ohio 1928).
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In examining the notion of happiness in the Ohio constitution, plaintiffs began by
studying the sources from which the clause was adopted. 9 Article I, Section 1 is based
on the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, which reads as follows: "We
hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness." 9"
Thomas Jefferson, in drafting the Declaration of Independence, borrowed language
from the first state bill of rights, George Mason's 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights.
Among the inalienable rights listed in the Virginia Declaration are "the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety."'" The language in the Ohio constitution, like that of
many other state constitutions, was essentially borrowed from the Declaration of
Independence and from the Virginia Declaration of Rights. The meaning of similar terms
in these documents can shed light on the content of the Ohio constitution.92
The definition of happiness has varied little from the era in which the Ohio
constitution was drafted. It was then defined as the "state in which the desires are
satisfied" and "good fortune." 9 3 In addition, a notion of happiness as the legitimate goal
of government was also generally accepted by Americans of the revolutionary period.94
Jefferson and Mason both believed that the best government is that which produces the
greatest degree of happiness and safety for the greatest number.95 Jefferson's use of the
concept of happiness as a term implying people's basic welfare was reflected in an earlier
plea to friends going to Europe to study the effects of politics "on the happiness" of the
people. He urged his friends "to take every opportunity to enter into the hovels of the la-
bourers ... see what they eat, how they are cloathed, whether they are obliged to labour
too hard....96 In the context of happiness as a goal of the government, happiness did
not merely connote a pleasant sensation but rather was understood as an end grounded
solidly in peoples' daily lives and welfare.97 While these indications of Jefferson's and
8" The Ohio constitutional provision of the right to obtain happiness and safety appeared in Ohio's first
constitution, which was adopted in 1802. OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. 8, § 1. When Ohio's present constitu-
tion was adopted in 1851, the right remained intact. OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 1.
90 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
9' VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS para. I (Va. 1776).
92 See D'Alton v. Ritchie, 119 N.E. 124, 126 (Ohio 1917) (concluding that language adopted from an
earlier document is generally held to have the meaning attributed to it under the earlier instrument).
9 SHERIDAN, supra note 81.
9' See Herbert Ganter, Jefferson's "Pursuit of Happiness" and Some Forgotten Men, 16 WM. & MARY
Q. 422, 558 n.29 (1936) (describing the origins of the notion that the greatest happiness is the goal of
government). See also JAMES M. BURNS & STEWART BURNS, A PEOPLES CHARTER 26-28 (1991). The
phrase "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" is often attributed to Francis Hutcheson, who is
generally referred to as the father of the Scotch school of philosophy.
9' Jefferson read extensively in the school of the Scottish philosophy, including the works of Francis
Hutcheson, who advocated "the greatest happiness for the greatest number." See A.E. DICK HOWARD,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 26-28, 41 (1974). Mason's views are apparent in the
Virginia Declaration of Rights, which provides that the best government is that which produces the greatest
degree of happiness and safety. VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS para. 3 (Va. 1776). In drafting the
Declaration, Jefferson paraphrased Locke's traditional trinity of life, liberty, and property, but he substituted
happiness for property. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). By this substitution,
Jefferson may have been making a statement about his priorities, making the larger quality of peoples' lives,
not merely the security of possessions, the effective test of the government's legitimacy. BURNS & BURNS,
supra note 94, at 41.
96 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in 8 JEFFERSON PAPERS 682
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
97 See BURNS & BURNS, supra note 94, at 41.
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Mason's concept of happiness do not serve as definitive evidence of the intended meaning
of the term in the 'Ohio constitution, it is evident that at the time of the drafting of the
Ohio constitution, concern for the basic needs of the less fortunate was at least one aspect
of happiness.
In addition, evidence exists that the founders of our nation contemplated some positive
action by the government to help the poor. Thomas Jefferson's concept of the pursuit of
happiness, for example, contemplated a positive duty to assist the poor. A scholarly study
devoted to Jefferson's works concluded:
The happiness principle is undoubtedly the most significant feature of
Jefferson's theory of rights, for it raises government above the mere negative
function of securing the individual against the encroachments of others. By
recognizing a right to the pursuit of happiness, the state is committed to aid
its citizens in the constructive task of obtaining their desires, whatever they
may be .... The state is to secure, not merely the greatest happiness of the
greatest number, but so far as possible the greatest happiness of all its citizens,
whatever their condition. It may well mean, therefore, that many will be
restrained from achieving the maximum of happiness, that others less fortunate
may obtain more than the minimum. No one will get all he wants, perhaps, but
so far as the power of the state can go, everyone will get something.98
Both the plain and ordinary meaning of happiness and its common usage in the
eighteenth century indicate that the notion of happiness cannot be entirely separated from
material well-being.99 Access to the minimal necessities of life, such as shelter or basic
medical care, is thus an indispensable prerequisite to the notion of happiness.' °0
B. Consideration of Modern Economic Conditions Underscores the Affirmative Nature of
Rights to Safety or Happiness
Constitutions are meant to endure. Therefore, unlike an ordinary law, the terms of the
Federal Constitution must be construed as living and evolving. Its terms are to be given
98 CHARLES M. WILTSE, THE JEFFERSONIAN TRADITION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1935), quoted in
Ganter, supra note 94, at 559 n.29. In addition, Jefferson wrote:
Whenever there is in any country, uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that
the laws of property have been so far extended as to violate natural right. The earth is given
as a common stock for man to labour and live on. [If land was appropriated to encourage
industry, he went on, other employment should be provided to those] excluded from the
appropriation. [As few as possible should be] without a little portion of the land.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in 8 JEFFERSON PAPERS 682 (Julian P.
Boyd ed., 1950).
Nearly all of the founders were heavily influenced by the theories of John Locke. See DAVID LITrLE,
Natural Rights and Human Rights: The International Imperative, in NATURAL RIGHTS AND NATURAL LAW:
THE LEGACY OF GEORGE MASON 3, 67 (Robert P. Davidow ed., 1986). Although Locke's theories are not
capable of easy caricature, he implied that government was obligated to provide each citizen with the
requisite goods for the preservation of life. Id. at 84, 88-89.
9' Myers v. Defiance, 36 N.E.2d 162, 166-67 (Ohio Ct. App. 1940) (interpreting the pursuit of happiness
"as the right to follow or pursue any occupation or profession without having a restriction imposed on one
not imposed on others"). While the meaning of happiness has received little other scrutiny, it has been by
no means limited to the pursuit of an occupation. See CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION, 1970-77
FINAL REPORT 444 (1977).
' See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections of the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1986).
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a flexible interpretation and application, so as to adapt to new and different circumstan-
ces.'0 ' Changes in social surroundings over the years since Ohio and other state
constitutions were adopted may impart new meaning to constitutional provisions and thus
require novel application and interpretation.
°2
Nearly a half century ago, in the State of the Union address of 1944, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt characterized the political nature of the Federal Bill of Rights as
no longer adequate to ensure freedom and equality. He recognized that as our economy
changed, true freedom could not exist without economic rights. In his words:
This Republic had its beginning, and grew to its present strength, under
the protection of certain inalienable political rights ... our rights to life and
liberty.
As our Nation has grown in size and stature, however-as our industrial
economy expanded-[political rights to life and liberty] proved inadequate
to assure us equality in the pursuit of happiness.
We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual
freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence.
"Necessitous men are not free men."
103
Roosevelt continued, articulating a "Second Bill of Rights" under which a new basis for
security and prosperity could be established for all, including:
The right to a useful and remunerative job... ;
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and
recreation... ;
The right of every family to a decent home;
The right to adequate medical care... ;
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age,
sickness, accident, and unemployment;
The right to a good education.1°4
The changes in economic conditions over the past 200 years suggest that the happiness
and safety clauses of the Ohio constitution should be interpreted as encompassing a right
to basic subsistence.
1. Where Insufficient Numbers of Jobs Exist, the Right to Safety is Meaningless Unless
Construed Affirmatively
In the early 1800s when the Ohio constitution was first drafted, Ohio, like many other
states, was primarily an agrarian society. Land was abundant and available to anyone to
settle, hunt, and farm. Poor persons who could not make a living in settled communities
had the option of moving to the frontier as long as they were capable of physical labor.
10' McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (observing that the Constitution was intended to
endure for ages and therefore should be adapted to the various crises of human affairs).
102 State ex rel. Columbus v. Ketterer, 189 N.E. 252, 256 (Ohio 1934) ("Constitutions are not lifeless or
static instruments whose interpretation is confined to the conditions and outlook which prevailed at the time
of their adoption.").
'13 90-1 CONG. REC. 55, 57 (1944).
'04 Id. Roosevelt also envisioned "freedom from want" as one of the four essential human freedoms.
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With industrialization, urbanization, and the growth of governmental and corporate
institutions, society was transformed. Able-bodied poor no longer have the option to
simply "go west" and claim land. Many people, especially those lacking education, skills,
and training or those with marginal health or social skills, experience unemployment and
termination of jobs with limited prospects for reemployment. In many instances, they do
not have the option of migrating to a situation any different from the one they would
leave behind. If they lack family able to house and support them, they are virtually
without options for meeting survival needs. Even the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
that "forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty."'0 5
Ohio, like a number of other states, has witnessed rising unemployment in recent
years. The Ohio unemployment rate for December 1991, excluding part-time and
discouraged 0 6 workers, was 6.5%, a figure representing more than 350,000 jobless
workers. 7 Although government played a role in creating such conditions, its role has
escaped wide-spread public attention. People have instead clung to the belief that any
able-bodied person wishing to work can find a job, and that each individual bears sole
responsibility for an inability to meet basic needs.' This belief regarding poverty, while
comforting in its ability to absolve others of any responsibility for poverty and to distance
ourselves from the poor, obscures a more accurate picture of present conditions. At the
current level of economic and social development in which the United States has
developed the ability to produce great wealth and surpluses of food, poverty and hunger
in our society result not from scarcity, but rather from political and economic decisions
and policies.09
The present bleak employment picture facing many current General Assistance
recipients'' stems in part from the effects of state and federal government as well as
private sector decisions. First, the state plays a role in economic development by defining
the areas in which the state chooses to intervene or not to protect the rights to property
and to contract."' In many ways, government has taken an even more active role in
economic decisions. Some governmental decisions have shaped the location of available
jobs and created disparities between the location of jobs and that of workers." 2
Government has also played a direct role in job creation, both through public sector
employment and through government contracting. Clearly, government choices in this area
affect the nature of employment opportunities.' 13
In addition to affecting employment opportunities, government plays a role in shaping
the circumstances that face unemployed and impoverished persons. First, the state, through
its fiscal policy, both on the revenue and spending sides, determines the amount of money
105 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
"0 Discouraged workers include those who have stopped seeking work and are thus not counted in the
normally publicized unemployment figures.
'o News Release, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, Jan. 31, 1992, at 1-2.
0 See Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 1409, 1439 (1991).
'09 See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON
WELFARE 7 (1989).
... See Memoranda of Amici Curiae Christ Church, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 579 (2d ed. 1988).
"2 For example, during the two world wars, government production policies for war plants drew massive
numbers of people into cities for work. Following the war, government did little to provide new jobs when
the war production ceased. Further, government spending to create interstate highway systems rather than
public transportation systems has shaped employment by spreading the distance between workers' homes and
their jobs.
.. Federal defense contracting presents an obvious example. The government's choice to contract for
high technology weapons systems creates high salary jobs for a few highly educated specialists while
creating far fewer jobs for low-skilled workers.
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available for social welfare or other programs to assist the poor." 4 For example, in
Ohio, a partially regressive tax structure has resulted in imposing the highest effective
taxes on individuals and families with the lowest incomes, while extracting the lowest rate
of tax from those with the highest incomes." 5 This results in lower tax revenues than
a progressive, equitable system and reduces the amount of money available to a state for
social welfare or other programs. In addition, the state shapes the circumstances facing
the poor by determining whether it will supplement federally funded housing programs
by making more affordable housing or shelter available to the needy and by defining
eligibility requirements for any such housing or shelter.
Governmental- policy affects the availability of jobs and other basic needs such as
affordable housing, although the extent to which government activity affects the incidence
of poverty is a subject of debate. The unemployed poor, both those who lack the
education, skill, or requisite health to find and maintain employment, and "able-bodied"
persons simply unable to locate work, face grave and imminent dangers when their
General Assistance benefits are terminated." 6 Many will face homelessness and
deprivation of basic health care.' Thus, in an economy which does not offer sufficient
jobs for all who seek and need work, and especially where the government has played a
role in creating the bleak economic conditions, the right to obtain happiness and safety
and to enjoy life are meaningless for large numbers of citizens unless the rights are
interpreted expansively to include a right to subsistence.
2. The Provision of Public Assistance as a Remedy for Imbalances in the Economy
Interpretation of constitutional language embodying a right to basic needs should not
be colored by a negative attitude toward public assistance as a "hand-out" program. As
mentioned earlier, and as recognized by the U. S. Supreme Court, forces outside the
control of the poor, such as the state of the economy, the unemployment rate, the
minimum wage, and the rising costs of shelter and health care, contribute to their
poverty.'" The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized the importance of welfare
assistance in that it "can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities
that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community."" 9
Recognizing a right to public assistance sufficient for subsistence thus can be described
as governmental action to correct imbalances in the economy.
Outside the area of public assistance for the poor, the government has acted through
subsidies to correct imbalances in the economy. Many private actors have grown
..4 The current federal budget deficit and the accumulated debt of past deficits burden the economy
through the weight of interest payments and threatened spending cuts. The deficit is the result of active
government decisions, particularly regarding tax policy. The current deficit and accumulated debt has
primarily resulted from tax cuts, particularly cuts benefitting the wealthiest taxpayers. ROBERT S. MCINTYRE,
INEQUALITY & THE FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICIT 3-4 (1991). As such, the federal deficit stems not from
increased spending, but from government decisions to cut taxes for the wealthy. Id.
"5 Ohio Taxes Poor at Rate 40% Higher than Rate of Affluent, CTJ NEWS (Citizens for Tax Justice),
Apr. 22, 1991, at I (stating that while Ohio has a progressive income tax, that tax represents only one of a
number of the taxes by which Ohio seeks revenue). Since 1985, Ohio has also relied heavily on regressive
property, sales, and excise taxes to meet fiscal needs. The scale of these regressive taxes has resulted in the
poorest Ohioans paying taxes at a 40% higher rate than the richest. The poorest 20% of Ohio taxpayers pay
13.4% of their income in taxes while the richest 1% pay only 9.6%. Id.
116 See Memoranda of Amici Curiae Christ Church, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
,7 Id.
11'8 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
119 Id.
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increasingly reliant on public funds for their business survival. 2' Our society has grown
to accept public subsidy of private business when it is deemed needed.
As the National Conference of Catholic Bishops noted, "[s]ome of the most generous
subsidies for individuals and corporations are taken for granted, and are not even called
benefits but entitlements." 2 ' For example, subsidies to farmers and ranchers are viewed
not as welfare but as a need to restore balance to a part of the economy thrown out of
equilibrium by economic forces beyond the farmers' control. The farm subsidies are
structured in a manner to preserve the farmers' dignity and self-esteem. Once subsidies
are paid to the farmers, the funds are no longer considered public; the government does
not attempt to monitor how farmers spend the subsidies.'22 In short, the government
subsidies are given to protect the economic stability and dignity of businessmen and
farmers.
General Assistance recipients are as harmed by economic factors beyond their control
as are farmers and businessmen. The provision of subsistence benefits to the unemployed
and impoverished adults is similar to the farm and business subsidies in that it serves to
restore stability in the lives of people damaged by economic forces while preserving the
individual's dignity and self-esteem. Consequently, a double standard that approves of
extensive public aid to business and farmers and disapproves of welfare assistance is
inappropriate. This double standard is all the more intolerable where, as in this case,
public assistance is constitutionally mandated and farm and business subsidies are
discretionary governmental actions.
C. International Human Rights Norms as an Aid to Construing State Constitutional
Provisions
1. The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living--Sources and Content
The rights to adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care have achieved
recognition as fundamental human rights in international law. This recognition represents
a universal legal affirmation of the principle that an individual cannot fully enjoy civil and
political rights or freedoms unless his basic needs are fulfilled.'23
"o See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, Social Welfare in the Public-Private State, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 487,
488-489 (1966) (stating that the shipping industry receives direct subsidies and indirect aid through "laws
favoring the American flag;" the railroad industry receives government support; farmers have long
received government subsidies to lessen the shock of economic fluctuations; ranchers receive indirect but
substantial subsidies through the opportunity to graze cattle on public land and use public water to irrigate
lands).
More recently, the federal government has provided massive public aid to rescue management,
shareholders, and depositors of failed savings and loan institutions. Also, government reliance on regressive
taxes to meet fiscal needs effectively provides subsidies to wealthy taxpayers. Similarly, the home mortgage
tax credit provides a subsidy to homeowners that is unavailable to the poor who can perhaps barely afford to
pay rent. Society has accepted these subsidies as necessary for economic stability.
121 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL LETTER ON
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 96-97 (1986).
122 Reich, supra note 120, at 489-90.
123 See Danilo Turk, The United Nations and the Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS: NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
ASPECTS 95, 102-03 (Franz Matscher ed., 1991) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION]. Although implementation of
economic rights is necessary for an individual to fully realize his civil and political rights, international law
places no priority on economic or social rights. Rather, "equal attention and urgent consideration should be
given to the implementation ... of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights." United Nations
Declaration of the Right to Development, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at art. 6, para. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/41/925 (1986).
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was approved without
dissent in 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations, is commonly
referred to as the International Magna Carta. 124 The Declaration constitutes an
authoritative interpretation of the obligation under the United Nations Charter to
observe human rights. 25 The Universal Declaration recognizes the right to an
adequate standard of living:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right
to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widow-
hood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his
control. 126
To provide a means of implementing the Universal Declaration, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights came into effect. 127 In nearly the
same terms as the Universal Declaration, the Economic and Social Covenant, in Article
11, recognizes the right to an adequate standard of living. More than 100 nations have
ratified the Economic Covenant, including all major industrialized nations, save for the
United States. In fact, every country, except the United States, that ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 2 also ratified the Economic and
Social Covenant. While this case was pending, the United States ratified the Civil and
Political Covenant. 29 Moreover, President Bush's representative to the United Nations
Commission of Human Rights, Ambassador Kenneth Blackwell, called for the United
124 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/8 10, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration].
125 The United Nations Charter, to which the United States is a party, commits nations to promote:
"higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and develop-
ment" and "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms .... U.N.
CHARTER art. 55, (a), (c).
126 Universal Declaration, supra note 124, at art. 25. The Universal Declaration also specifies that
everyone has the right to work. Included with the right to work are the rights "to free choice of employ-
ment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.... Everyone who
works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence
worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection." Id. at art.
23.
The economic and social rights set out in international law are not foreign to American political and
cultural traditions. In fact, the economic rights to subsistence and to work owe their origins, at least in part,
to American principles. The Covenant was strongly influenced by the "Second Bill of Rights" outlined in
President Roosevelt's message to the House, Jan. 1I, 1944. See Roosevelt, supra note 103.
127 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No.
16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6317 (1976) [hereinafter Economic and Social Covenant]. The major documents
created under the auspices of the United Nations, particularly the United Nations Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter Civil and Political Covenant], are
collectively referred to as the International Bill of Rights, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS: A COMPILATION OF TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND DECLARATIONS OF ESPECIAL INTEREST TO
THE UNITED STATES (Richard B. Lillich ed., 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS].
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States to ratify the Economic and Social Covenant. 130 The right to subsistence is also
protected by regional international law.''
The rights recognized in the covenant are legally binding on parties; they are not
merely aspirations. 32 Where necessary, international human fights law requires states
to undertake positive measures to ensure the promotion of human rights. For example,
protection of the right to life under the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights is not limited to protection against arbitrary deprivation of life. Rather, it
requires states to take positive measures, such as measures to decrease infant mortality
and to increase life expectancy.
33
Under the Economic and Social Covenant, each ratifying nation is obligated to take
steps, to the maximum of its available resources, to achieve progressively the full
realization of the economic rights. 34 Thus, while the Economic and Social Covenant
acknowledges constraints due to the limits of available resources, it imposes the obligation
to take deliberate and concrete steps toward the goal of full realization of the relevant
130 Ambassador J. Kenneth Blackwell, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 485, 502 (1992) (reviewing HOWARD TOLLEY,
JR., THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1987)). See also Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the
United States and International Human Rights Law: Toward an 'Entirely New Strategy,' 44 HASTINGS L.J.
79 (1992).
13' The Inter-American human rights system operates under the auspices of the Organization of American
States (O.A.S.). The O.A.S. Charter, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, recognizes a "right to
material well-being" and a right to work that includes "a system of fair wages, that ensure life, health, and
a decent standard of living for the worker and his family, both during his working years and in his old age
or when any circumstance deprives him of the possibility of working." Protocol of Amendment to the
Charter of the OA.S., Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607. The Charter also binds parties to "dedicate every
effort" to achieve adequate housing for all. Id. The United States is a party and thus bound by the Charter
and the Protocol of Buenos Aires.
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which is also an instrument of the Inter-
American human rights system and also binding on the United States, provides that "[e]very person has the
right to the preservation of his health, through sanitary and social measures, relating to food, clothing,
housing and medical care, to the extent permitted by public and community resources." American Declara-
tion of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res., 9th Conf., O.A.S. Off. Re. OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965).
The American Declaration also provides that each person has the duty "to cooperate with the state and the
community with respect to social security and welfare, in accordance with his ability and with existing
circumstances." Id., at art. 35.
The binding effect of the Declaration on the United States is made clear in 1987 INTER-AMERICAN
YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 296 (1990).
32 The rights in the Economic and Social Covenant are entitled to the same protection as the rights
contained in the Civil and Political Covenant. See Symposium, The Limburg Principles on the Implementa-
tion of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 121, 123
(1987); E.V.O. Dankwa & Cees Flinterman, Commentary by the Rapporteurs on the Nature and Scope of
States Parties' Obligations, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 136 (1987). All forms of deprivation of human dignity, whether
in the civil and political arena or in the economic area, are equally intolerable.
133 Economic and Social Covenant, supra note 127, at art. 12. The Universal Declaration provides that
"[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of person." Universal Declaration, supra note 124, at
art. 3. The right to life is also protected by the Civil and Political Covenant, which provides that: "Every
human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of life." Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 127, at art. 6. The United Nations Human Rights
Committee, which monitors states' progress under the Civil and Political Covenant, has supported a broad
interpretation of the right to life which includes the protection of subsistence. The Committee stated that the
protection of the right to life requires states to take positive measures and suggested measures to decrease
infant mortality and to increase life expectancy. General Comment No. 6(16), at 93-94, U.N. Doc. A/37/40,
reprinted in DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 329 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990). The Committee's understanding that the right to life embraces protection of subsistence is
apparent.
134 Economic and Social Covenant, supra note 127, at art. 2(1). There is no allowance for progressive
implementation under the Civil and Political Covenant.
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rights within a reasonably short time.'35 The committee of experts charged with
monitoring implementation of the rights in the Economic and Social Covenant interpreted
the covenant as imposing, at the very least, an obligation to ensure the satisfaction of
minimum essential levels of food, basic shelter, and health care. 3 6 A failure to do so
cannot be justified by a lack of available resources unless the state demonstrates that
every effort has been made to use all available resources in an attempt to satisfy those
minimum obligations.'37 The committee further commented that even in times of severe
resource constraint, the vulnerable members of society can and must be protected by
relatively low-cost targeted programs.' 38 Finally, any deliberately retrogressive measures
in this regard would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of rights
provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available
resources. 
39
2. The International Human Right to an Adequate Standard of Living-At Home in Ohio
International human rights law has become an accepted means of providing useful
content for clarifying and supplementing domestic law, both state and federal, both
constitutional and statutory. 40 International legal recognition of the right to an adequate
standard of living, including minimal food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, should be
of interest to all advocates of the poor because international norms can serve as a valuable
aid in interpreting domestic law.
The power of international legal norms to fill in the gaps of federal law, both
statutory and constitutional, was firmly established by the decade of the 1980s.
International human rights norms were used in interpreting a federal immigration
statute; 14 1 in interpreting whether overcrowding of pre-trial detainees was incompatible
with the canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice embodied
in the Due Process Clause, as well as whether overcrowding of convicted prisoners was
incompatible with the "evolving standards of decency" which are basic to jurisprudence
on the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment;'42 in
' Id. See also Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 156 (1987).
136 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at para.
10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1990/8 (1991). The General Comment is fully discussed in Bruno Simma, The
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in IMPLEMENTA-
TION, supra note 123, at 92; see also Scott Leckie, An Overview and Appraisal of the Fifth Session of the
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 13 HuM. RTS. Q. 545, 564 (199 1).
... U.N. ESCOR, supra note 136, at 11.
138 Id. at 12.
139 Id. at 4.
140 See Hans A. Linde, Comments, 18 INT'L LAW. 77 (1984); Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The
Use of Human Right Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts,
10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 611-628 (1989) (observing that the Supreme Court's reliance on human rights to
provide useful content for domestic law has steadily increased); Gordan A. Christenson, The Uses of
Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 4 HOUs. J. INT'L. L. 39 (1981); Kathryn
Burke et al., Application of International Human Rights Law in State and Federal Courts, 18 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 291 (1983).
141 Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795-99 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Rodriguez-Femandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (looking to the international human rights
norms against arbitrary detention to provide content to the relevant federal statute and the Constitution).
14 Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1192-93 (D. Conn. 1980), modified on other grounds, 651
F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners "form[s] part of the body of international human rights principles establishing standards for decent
and humane conduct by all nations").
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interpreting the Eighth Amendment to proscribe imposition of the death penalty on
juveniles who were less than fifteen years old at the time of the commission of the
crime;' 43 and in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to ban racially discriminatory state laws."
The use of international human rights norms to aid in giving content to state laws and
constitutions is equally well-established. Human rights norms have been used to interpret
state law in a variety of contexts,' n including their use as an aid in determining the
content and reach of welfare rights. This is demonstrated in Boehm v. Superior Court, in
which international human rights norms were invoked to aid in interpreting a state law
requiring that the poor be given enough money to adequately "relieve and support"
them.'46 The judge prominently quoted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which provides that everyone shall have the right to an adequate standard of living,
including food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, 47 and interprets the California
welfare statute as guaranteeing the grant of funds sufficient not only for food and shelter,
but also for clothing, transportation, and medical care.
48
In addition, international human rights norms have been used to expand state
protection of rights beyond that guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. For example, the
U.S. Supreme Court has refused to hold that education is a fundamental right.
49
However, both West Virginia and California held education to be a fundamental right
under their state constitutions. In Pauley v. Kelly, s° the West Virginia Supreme Court
referred to human rights norms to interpret the state constitution. The court noted that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights "appears to proclaim education to be a
fundamental right of everyone, at least on this planet. ' 15 Accordingly, the court
interpreted education to be a fundamental right under the state constitutional requirement
14' Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)
(citing United Nations declarations as evidence of "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society" for Eighth Amendment purposes).
" Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 673 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring); id. at 649-50 (Black, J.,
concurring) (citing the United Nations Charter as additional support for invalidating part of California's
racially discriminatory alien land law).
'41 See Stephen Rosenbaum, Lawyers Pro Bono Publico: Using International Human Rights Law on
Behalf of the Poor, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 109, 115-21 (Ellen Lutz, Hurst Hannum, &
Kathryn Burke eds., 1989). See also Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 132 n.21 (Or. 1981) (citing to
numerous international documents as examples of principles governing the treatment of prisoners).
146 Boehm v. Superior Ct., 223 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1986). In that case, remarkably similar to Daugherty,
county welfare recipients filed a lawsuit when the public assistance grants they received were reduced to the
minimal level necessary for food and shelter. The grants made no allowance for clothing, medical care, or
transportation. State law required that the poor be given enough money to adequately "relieve and support"
them. WELF. & INST. § 17000.
Universal Declaration, supra note 124.
4 Boehm, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 720. The court commented that:
Indeed, it defies common sense and all notions of human dignity to exclude from minimum
subsistence allowances for clothing, transportation, and medical care. Such allowances are
essential and necessary to 'encourage [self-respect and] self-reliance' ... in a 'humane'
manner consistent with modem standards.... Without a clothing allowance, recipients must
wear tattered clothing and wom out shoes. The lack of adequate and decent clothing and
essential transportation is damaging both to recipients' self-respect and their ability to obtain
employment. Finally, to leave recipients without minimum medical assistance is inhumane
and shocking to the conscience.
ld.
149 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
'io Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979).
Is' ld. at 864.
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that the legislature provide "thorough and efficient" schools.'52 Similarly, in California,
the Supreme Court determined that education was a fundamental right, applied strict
scrutiny, and invalidated a school financing system under the equal protection clause of
the state constitution.'53
Reference to international human rights norms confirms that state constitutional
guarantees of safety and happiness should be interpreted to encompass an affirmative right
to assistance sufficient to prevent homelessness and to provide medical care. International
norms indicate that subsistence rights must be implemented to the maximum of the state's
available resources.
To fully implement the right to subsistence, the state should provide assistance
sufficient for minimum food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.' 54 Given the resources
of each state in the U.S., it is fair to say that the subsistence needs of all should be met
without delay. One commentator has stated:
In the United States, we have neither embraced a domestic constitutional
right to housing, as have such western democracies as Sweden and the
Netherlands, nor do we now profess that our citizens have the 'fundamental
right, regardless of economic circumstances, to enjoy adequate shelter at
reasonable costs,' as does our neighbor Canada. Moreover, we have not
authorized our government to take 'extraordinary steps' to alleviate any
housing shortage, as has Germany. In none of these countries, nor in any
other western democracy, with the exception of Great Britain (whose current
government shares this government's political vision), does the extent of
homelessness even begin to approach the dimensions of our own.'55
At a minimum, international law dictates that states should work toward progressive
implementation by all available means even if limited resources prevent full satisfaction
of the right. In the present case, the duty to work toward fulfilling subsistence rights
clearly precludes Ohio from taking a step backward to reduce General Assistance
payments both in amount and by implementing a six-month limitation.
V. SHATTERING MISCONCEPTIONS
A. Fundamental Constitutional, Civil, and Political Rights Often Entail Significant
Affirmative Expenditures by the Government
One obstacle that must be surmounted in recognizing an affirmative right to basic
needs is the misconception that constitutionally protected rights do not impose affirmative
obligations on the part of the government. In fact, many revered federal constitutional
rights and their state counterparts require overt positive action as well as substantial
government expense for their implementation. To effectively guarantee the right to
assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions,'56 both the U.S. and state governments
2 Id. at 878.
5 Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II) 557 P.2d 929, 952-58, (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
See also Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1258 (Cal. 1971).
"u This amount is determined annually in Ohio, and is referred to as the standard of need. OHIO ADMIN.
CODE § 5101:1-21-05 (A)(l) (1991).
"' Curtis Berger, Beyond Homelessness: An Entitlement to Housing, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 315, 334-35
(1990-91) (footnotes omitted).
156 U.S. CONST. amend, VI.
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must maintain, at significant cost, public defender systems to assist indigent defen-
dants." 7 Similarly, to ensure free exercise of the right to a jury trial in both civil and
criminal matters,158 the government must bear the cost and administrative responsibility
of empaneling juries. 159 The right to a fair and speedy trial in all criminal prosecu-
tions 64 obligates the government to maintain a well-staffed judicial system, including
the availability of services such as sign language interpretation for the deaf, language
translation, and psychiatric assistance for indigent mentally ill defendants.
Likewise, the constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment16' does
not merely require government to refrain from action. Rather, this civil right imposes
substantial positive obligations on the government to remedy inhumane prison conditions
by refurbishing existing prisons or closing intolerable ones. 162 In a number of cases,
governments have entered into consent decrees that acknowledge the government
obligation to provide essential services to inmates, including reasonable medical care, 63
access to legal resources," and adequate supervision for their protection, 65 again all
hefty positive obligations with significant costs.
Further, the First Amendment right to freedom of expression,1 66 perhaps the most
revered of civil rights, has at times entailed affirmative government action and
considerable cost to ensure its enjoyment by all citizens. The most salient examples of this
reality are cases in which hate groups such as the Nazis or the Ku Klux Klan sought to
assemble and speak in public. Guaranteeing the rights of such groups to assemble and
speak invariably required the use of significant government resources in the form of police
protection. 167
This list demonstrates that fundamental constitutional rights in fact require affirmative
government action at significant public expense to ensure their enjoyment. Recognized
constitutional rights are not merely negative rights. In fact, whether a government is
burdened with an affirmative obligation to protect a right or whether its obligation is
limited to restraint depends on whether the citizen is able to provide the necessary
protection for himself. For example, if a criminal defendant cannot afford counsel, the
117 Estimated budgeted expenditures for federal government public defender systems in 1992 were $193
million. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Govern-
ment, Fiscal Year 1992 4-264 (1991). Similarly, Ohio expenditures to ensure the right to counsel were:
1990, $31 million; 1991, $32 million (est.); 1992, $32 million (est.). Ohio Office of Budget & Management,
State of Ohio Executive Budget 7.10.01 (1991).
'5 U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5.
159 To provide jury allowances and other expenses (such as refreshments) in all federal jury trials, the
U.S. government spent $54 million in 1990 and estimated amounts of $60 million in 1991 and $70 million
in 1992. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S.
Government, Fiscal Year 1992 4-265 (1991).
'60 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10.
161 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
162 See, e.g., Jones v. Willensberg, 330 F. Supp 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (ordering a wide range of
improvements); Rhem v. Malcome, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) aff'd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974)
(ordering jail facility to close).
161 See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
64 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (holding that Constitution requires inmates to have access to
adequate law library or legal services).
165 See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
'66 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
167 It is generally recognized that the police have a duty to protect speakers' rights. See generally Feiner
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 326-27 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 331 (Douglas, J., dissenting). An
example of very costly police protection occurred when 400 police in riot gear assembled to protect 25 Nazi
marchers at a march in Chicago in 1978, which followed a controversial march through Skokie, Illinois. See
GEOFFERY STONE et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1016 (1986).
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government's role does not cease upon its assurance that it is not interfering with the
defendant's right to have counsel. The government must take the affirmative step to
ensure counsel is provided.
The right to obtain safety or happiness is no different than the right to counsel. If a
citizen is facing homelessness or a lack of medical care, and cannot afford to protect
himself from these dangerous situations, the government must act affirmatively to protect
the threatened safety and happiness.
B. The Economic Right to Subsistence is Justiciable
Despite the United States Supreme Court's unjustified characterization of economic
rights as presenting intractable and unmanageable issues,168 courts in fact can readily
define, adjudicate, and enforce 69 a basic right to subsistence. This is true regardless of
whether a state chooses to provide cash assistance to allow a person to purchase the
necessities of shelter, food, and medical care or whether the state chooses to provide
subsistence aid in kind, by the provision of adequate housing, shelter, food, and medical
care.
In terms of cash assistance, experts in the relevant fields can readily determine the
amount of income that a person or family needs to meet minimal requirements, such as
food, clothing, housing, utilities, transportation, personal items and incidental items for
subsistence. In fact, the Ohio Department of Human Services, like other state welfare
departments, annually calculates such an amount as the "need standard," In 1991, the
Ohio department calculated the need standard for one person at $487 per month; for a
household of two persons at $670 per month; and for a household of four persons at
$1010 per month. 70  In terms of in kind assistance, experts and standards such as
housing codes could be used to determine if shelter, food and medical care provided by
the state are adequate. This theory suggests that a court can readily define the parameters
of a right to subsistence.
The relative simplicity of defining the scope of a right to basic needs is perhaps better
appreciated in comparison with the judiciary's task in defining the scope of several
fundamental civil and political rights, such as the right to free speech, to freedom of
religion or to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. The rights to freedom
of expression and religion have not been subject to precise definition. Both rights have
fueled scores of interesting and controversial judicial opinions over the years. The fact that
the rights to freedom of expression or religion cannot be easily quantified in no way
diminishes their status as fundamental rights. Similarly, the right to privacy embodied in
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures defies precise definition and
68 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) ("[T]he intractable economic, social and even
philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this
Court."). Yet underlying this claim of judicial helplessness lies much rhetoric regarding poverty: that
poverty is somehow built into the basic structure of our society and our legal system; that eradication of
poverty, if possible, would require a radical transformation of our society. Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of
Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1501 (1991). The discussion elsewhere in
this brief regarding subsidies in other sectors of our economy exposes the weakness of this rhetoric and
indicates that welfare assistance programs parallel other pervasive forms of public assistance.
See Sar Levitan & Robert Taggart, The Great Society Did Succeed, 91 POL. SCI. Q. 601 (1977) (expert
studies indicate that courts and legislatures can effectively assure provision of basic subsistence rights).
169 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 35 (1990) (upholding the trial court's exercise of equitable
powers to order increased property tax rate).
'o OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:1-21-05 (1991).
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thus has engendered numerous judicial decisions in the attempt to define what is a
reasonable search or seizure. 7 '
VI. FACING THE DIFFICULT CONSEQUENCES
The reluctance of a state court to interpret the state's constitution as granting a right
to full basic assistance is understandable. The judiciary may fear that such a right will
destroy individual motivation to provide for oneself, fostering ever increasing dependency
on the state, or that the state could become a magnet to indigents of other states enabling
the indigents to take advantage of the state's generosity. To state officials working with
already strained budgets, an influx of the poor from other states could be described as
catastrophic or worse.
As a result of the extensive poverty in the United States and the unfairness of a
scenario in which any state that provides adequate public assistance could be "punished"
with the influx of out-of-state poor, the problem cries out for a federal solution. As
discussed above, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has, rightly or not, chosen to absolve
the federal government from any affirmative responsibility to meet the basic needs of the
poor. As a result, the problem of poverty trickles down to the states.
Yet the fear of recognizing a state right to subsistence benefits need not be
overwhelming. State courts and legislatures would have considerable leeway in drawing
the parameters of what a right to basic needs entails. For example, as the plaintiffs in
Daugherty urged, the right to safety encompasses the right to adequate shelter and basic
medical care.' 72 A state could satisfy this mandate in several ways: 1) by providing cash
assistance to allow a person to purchase necessities; 2) by providing subsistence aid in
kind, through the provision of adequate housing or shelter and medical care; or alternately,
3) in the case of impoverished adults who are physically and mentally able to work, the
government could meet its obligation by making employment available, either in the
private or public sector. Employment opportunities would enable them to earn sufficient
income to obtain food, health care and shelter for themselves and their dependents. If state
officials worry that a constitutional right to subsistence would destroy the motive to work
and foster dependency on the state, they could choose the latter option.
The state would have to determine what type of shelter and what extent of medical
care is minimally required by a right to subsistence. The definition of adequate shelter,
for example, could span the spectrum from the modicum of shelter in a safe and sanitary
dorm or barracks style building to the ideal of the provision of a modest private apartment
or home. Obviously, a state's choice regarding these issues would influence how much
of a magnet the state's plan would be to the poor of other states. Likewise, states would
have the authority to define what constitutes minimally adequate health care and to
determine how the care should be provided. Again, a state's choice would affect how
attractive the state becomes to non-resident poor. Also, all or most states have hospitals
that provide free care for the poor, at least for emergencies; therefore, the declaration that
citizens of a state have a constitutional right to minimally adequate medical assistance
may not draw droves of poor non-residents to the state. Many of a state's fears about the
effects of recognizing a right to subsistence thus may be allayed by careful thought
regarding the parameters of the right.
"' This issue is so complex that entire volumes have been dedicated to it. See, e.g., JOHN WESLEY
HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE (2d ed. 1991).
172 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
April was a cruel month in Ohio. In April of 1991, the General Assistance program
was slashed, leaving thousands of poor individuals in Ohio with no financial or medical
assistance for six months of the year. The safety net in Ohio, as in other states, was
slashed. Increasing numbers of poor are left vulnerable to the dangers of homelessness,
inadequate nutrition, and the lack of medical care. Once denied General Assistance funds
necessary to provide shelter, clothing, medicine, or other basic hygiene needs, the
likelihood that these people will have any chance of finding work or participating in
community life decreases even further.
In this era when the federal government recognizes no rights to subsistence, state
constitutional rights to happiness and safety may serve as the source of an affirmative
right to public assistance sufficient in amount or kind to satisfy the basic needs of the
poor. The argument that Ohio's constitutional right to "seek and obtain happiness and
safety" encompasses a right to public assistance sufficient to prevent homelessness and
provide basic health care has been made in litigation in the state courts of Ohio in
Daugherty v. Wallace.
The largest task facing plaintiffs in making such an argument is overcoming the
resistance to the idea that the rights to safety and happiness impose an affirmative
obligation on the state government to provide some extent of public assistance to the poor.
Indeed, the Daugherty plaintiffs' claims were dismissed from the lower court on this
basis. As Plaintiffs have urged on appeal, however, the constitutional provisions should
be construed affirmatively. An affirmative construction is especially warranted in light of
modem economic conditions, in which there are not sufficient jobs for all who seek them,
and in light of international human rights law establishing a right to an adequate standard
of living.
Although the ultimate success of the plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the Ohio
constitution remains to be seen, their strategy of litigating the happiness and safety clauses
of the state constitution may be adapted by advocates of the poor in other states facing
serious reductions in public assistance benefits. It is our hope that state constitutions will
prove to be better vehicles than the Federal Constitution for responding to the needs of
the impoverished and unemployed.
[Vol. 2:1
